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INThODUCTION 
T,he Panic of 1807, its causes, extent, results, 
and the remedies taken to correct the chaotic situation form 
the objectives of this investigation. In the process of pre-
senting the relevant material in a clear and concise manner, 
the writer has a five-fold pur/Jose in mind. In the first }Jlace 
a generalized picture of the back,ground previous to the October 
scare is given. Secondly, the mental set of the people directly 
involved and the people affected is mirrored from primary 
sources. Thirdly, eye-witness accounts of what was seen and 
what the probable effects would be are given. Fourthly, remedi-
al measures taken to alleviate the financial and economic in-
stability of the Panic are described. Finally, an evaluation 
of the causes and remedies and their immediate effects are set 
down. 
In pursuing the investigation, it became patent 
that many leaders were distfessed over the instability of their 
money and some seized the opportunity to profit through illegal 
means. Others were blissfully ignorant of the impending crash, 
while the majority cared little or nothinF, about the situation 
and continued to live as they had without regard to existing 
i 
"..., -~------------------------------------------------------------------~ ii 
~I)W ttions cwd their ulttE18.te eff'·cts. It [lay be stated that 
t Lie I",'nole period WB.S a.uilost too hum8n to eV2.1u,.':,te. It is tllis 
very [f1.Jmc,ness, no','€ver, that r}1(:,J~,::;s tis ~,prio() in our nation I s 
0istory so vital, absorbing, and perha~s frofttable to us a 
'alf l'.!el1tury rerr10ver).. 80YD0 of tne I'.!('nc itions are still with us 
today and prob~bly will remain. It is rn11y too true trBt little 
can be done to i:Yltt a stop to c2<relessness, over-sl-,encjing, and 
ill-advised investr;:ents. A picture of past disasters will no 
doubt continue to be seen by IPany unseeing eyes. Thus, it is to 
~oose W.O ~ay profit from past rnistak,::;s t2t this paper is 
,lop~'fully ciedicated a~; ".'eLL as to tnose W,O are interested in 
numan al'.!tion for its OTl.'TI merit. 
GEAP'I'EH I 
lhHTED 8T J\.'L~8 
tIur~Rn nature t8 Sll'? n tflat 
not ~n~ save tndustrial ~xveri~ 
encs of the sort mill convince 
tJ~e avera';e man that a limit is 
set by financial la~r.T to t .,le use 
of credit in r3iid indu3trial 
expansion, and that the llrJ1it 
will usually l~ve been very 
nearly r,..,ac [Led when business pros-
lJerity seems to have re;',c ~'e(l its 
!'.1ost eXi'tlted ;-;eig ,It s. 'F:ac n suc-
cessive business ~eneration, tnsre-
fore, lJu.rsues :LtS way in citeerfl..J.l 
el"" fiance of the tea{~ d Tj/'. s of t i.le 
p,~st; eacn blows its O'ern ftncmf!i.al 
8.nd industrial bubble; e~':'i, nfter 
two or thrr-e dis;C:;Rrded warnin:cs, 
f.lbS to face t e terrifif! l!f:'nalty; 
and, having passf:'d throug n tos.t 
experience, eElch r:lay be deppnded 
on for conservatism un.til toe next 
generation of eXl:,loitine: finC'iTlciers 
CODes on the scene. 1 
It is, th8refore, uncier'3t'?nciable t ne.t t (:e six 
depressions in the United States fro'."'1 1830 to 1887 ".T8rC' tHe 
2 
result of internal ind1J):~trial cono i-r.; ions • t1 It vmula be 
c1 ifficult to nEi.me any ldnd of occurrenC8 or conr:i t ion 1\Thic.n 
1 Alexander D.l~oyes, liThe Cycle of Prosperity, II Century .lJag-
azine, 75: 632, November 1907 to Al_Til 1908 
2 Appendix A shm"ls the effects of th8se de:~:ressions U, on t t-::e 
alconolic consuL1ption in the country 
1 
affects business, that did not take place during that }Jeriod." 
Beginning with 1887 five more depressions descended upon the 
financial world. One was caused by the jJanic of 1880; another 
was brought about by a vanic three years later; tne financial 
derangement of April, 1894 was another; the Venezuela Procla-
2 
mation of December, 1885 provoked the fourth; and finally the 
threatened abolition of t~e gold standard in JulY, 18~6, brought 
4 
about the fifth. 
It would be misleaaing to neglect mentioning that 
these years (1833-1897) were not necessarily Imv financial ones 
for the majority. It is this writer's intention to touch the 
high spots occasionally in order to show a clearer understanding 
of the background of the Panic of 1907. It must be understood, 
however, that many successfully withstood the crushing effects 
of such tragic happenings; but the great majority of the people 
were victims of the financial strain each time it occurred. 
In order to clarify tne situation, it is necessary 
to obtain a clear-cut understanding of the terms "-[.Janicl! and 
3 George H. Hull, .Industrial De1lressions, Frederick A. Stokes 
Co., New York, 1911, 158 ~ 
4 Ibid., 163 
Itdepression rt • As Juglar indicates: 
A ••• panic may be defined as 
a stoppage on t he rise of prices: 
• •• t he period VI! nen ne'',f buyers 
are not to be found. • ••• A 
panic mej be b~oadly stated as 
due to overtrading, which causes 
general business to need more 
than available capital, thus pro-
ducing general lack of credit. 5 
On the other hand, the term "depression" may be defined as " ••• 
a prolonged period of financial and comrnercial stagnation char-
acterized by unemployment, restricted cr8Ciit, low prices, and 
6 
general social distress." It must be Ul1derstood that not all 
depreSSions involve panics; yet, panics invariably bring about 
immediate depressions. Sometimes der,pessions occur 1Nithout the 
chaos engendered by a panic. Such are due to the bad internal 
structure of industry itself. Hence, these are;uite indepen-
7 
dent of panic. 
Financial circles are almost immediately paralysed 
by a panic, even though it be short lived, lasting only a day" 
a weelc, or perhaps a few months. The situation in a depression 
5 Clement Juglar, A Brief History of Panics and Their Periodi-
£J!l Occurrence in the United StAtes, translated and edited by 
De Courcy W. Thorn, G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1893, 2-3 
6 Franklin J. Meine, ed., Webster's Encyclopedic Dictionaa, 
Columbia Educational Books, Inc., Chicago, 1940, 200 
7 Hull, 18 
haS a more lasting effect and does not bring about the il1!n:ea.iate 
effects of a panic. Unfortunately, it is a more durable con-
dition. 
Hull gives a clear picture of toe general reaction 
of t roe people to the Panic of 1907 i.i1Then he states: 
The public, however, will al-
most inVariably identify the 
panic as being responsible for 
the prolonged depression, 
simply because the panic, be-
ing startling and spectacular, 
will make a vivid impression 
upon the public mind. 8 
The table below shows ap~roximately the lapse of 
time in t ne differing ups and dO\vns in the panics and depress-
9 
ions from 1835 to 1807: 
Years of 
largest 
construc-
tion 
1835 
1847 
1856 
1864 
1872 
1881 
1899 
1903 
1907 
8 Hull, 20 
9 Ib:i.d., 191 
Number 
of years 
in the 
dovm grade 
7.5 
4.5 
5.0 
5.0 
6.0 
15.0 
1.5 
1.0 
-* Minor financial flurries 
Number 
of years 
of 10\.~T 
prices 
3.0 
2.5 
2.5 
2.0 
2.5 
3.0 
1.25 
2.0 
Number 
of years Special 
in the fea~ures 
up ~;rade 
4.5 Panic in fall~j7 
3.0 Panic in 1857 
3.0 -* 
3.0 Panic in fall,~ 
3.0 Five financial 
disturbances be-
tween 1890 and 
1896 
:;.5 
3.25 * 
Panic in fall,l~ 
~----------------------------------~--~ 5 
The reasons given for the majority of these con-
6i tions have been blamed upon a multiplicity of factors. l-iany 
economists are not hesitant to bring forth their pet theories 
regarding the causes, yet historians are united in their ex-
planation of the effects. This thesis is then concerned with 
the 1907 upheaval and uses such crises as background material 
for a clearer understanding. 
Confidence in the prosperity 'Nhich began in 1897 
carried ov(~r to succeeding years. The expanding of many busi-
nesses necessitating corporate financing severely strained the 
money market. The cash holding of the national banks on October 
5, 1887, was ttii~2j88,900,OOO. Hevenue exce\?ded eX:tJenditures and 
the :problem of surplus financing great ly per ,:Jlexed the feaeral 
10 
Treasury. Several circumstances contrtbuted to the national 
prosperity. A vast amount of grain was exported~ to Europe and 
gold iml-,orts were used to pay for this. In the meantime, the 
volurne of our own gold production had been increased. In l~Ol, 
a partial repeal-of the taxes necessitated by the Syanish War 
was welcomed by financiers no less tnan the full removal of such 
taxes one year later. Another circurnstance which helped 
10 Davis R. Dewey, F:i,.!!a}!cial His.!.ory o{ ~"he Uniteg _~tC!tes, 
Longmans, .Green, ann Co., New York, 1;;)34, 477 
~----------~------------------~ 6 
indirectly was the currency act of 1800. This made it easier 
11 
and more profitable for the banks to issue notes. 
Des}:;ite the obvious external pros~0erity, ~iJarnings 
of financial storms were se~n in a tighteni~g of the money 
situation in New York financial circles. The Secretary of the 
Treasury became alarned at this anci toe·k un~~·recedented steps 
to relieve the situation. Some municipal ami state bonds were 
accepted by the banks on the provision that the released 
national bonds must be used as a basis for additional note cir-
culation. To make it even easier J the banks were permit"ced by 
the Secretary to keep their federal deposits "rithout any reserve 
backing. Naturalj.y J the banks were only too happy to cooperate 
wi th the Secretary of the Treasury in these un},receriented steps. 
The Clearing House Association of New York refused to make use 
of this permission to accept government deposits without reserve 
requirements. By mid-summer of 1903 another scare began to rise, 
further tightening the money situation as cash was needed to 
move the crops. Mr. Shaw then announced that the internal 
revenue receipts already collected wouia be transferred to the 
12 
banks. 
11 ° .M. W. Sprague, History of Cri_~es under the National Banking 
Syst eII! , 61 Congress, 2 session, Senate DocUIDent 538, 1Nashing-
ton, 1910, 217 
12 Dewey, FiIlancia1 Hi~toa, 4:78 
7 
Some, however, were of "C'e opinion that the Secre-
tarY of the Treasury had no authority to make such a transfer. 
T he 'Treasury Department on the other hand believed t nat the de-
pository banks were part and parcel of toe Treasury. Thus, it 
was nothing more t .(Jan a matter of shifting money from one pocket 
13 
to another. 
From the above, it is abundantly clear that l.lr. 
Shaw was overly helpful to the New York banking circles. The 
majority of Americans were quick to realize that the Secretary 
was unduly anxious on behalf of the New York bankers. Conse-
quently, rumors began circulating to the effect that Shaw was 
favoring Wall Street entirely too much to the determent of the 
people at large. 
Not withstanding the obvious shaky financial sit-
uation, the people were lulled into a false feeling of security. 
A.s Mead tells us: 
••• from 1887 to October, 1907, 
tnis country enjoyed prosperity. j\f!:oney became most abundant, 
thanks to the increased national 
bank-note circulation, so tl~t 
the amount in the country grew 
during the years ••• from twenty-
13 Dewey, Financial i::IistorY, 478 
two dollars to thirty-four li.ollars 
per capita. Tratie, both foreign 
ana domestic, increased by leaps 
and bounds. The prices of staple 
articles rose. Labor was in in-
creasing Qemanci at higher and 
higher wages. Cor~orations, firms, 
communities, and individuals ri-
valed each other in incre~sed ex-
penditures. 14 
;.1. 
8 
Such reports of the United states' great financial 
stability during t ne ten year period (18~7-1807) fail to present 
a clear lJicture. It would be more accurate to state that the 
vast majority of t LJe people assumed the boom }Jeriod to be that 
of a high economic normalcy, but in reality it was but the false 
prelude to the bubble's bursting. 
The financial aaolescence of tne United States was 
based on the strl1f(gle from infancy to the attainment of maturity 
in a feriod of a little over one hUndred years. T iJiS strug~le 
was based u;,Jon the eagerness of the peo}Jle to succeed, to defeat 
youthful inex1Jerience and to gain the reSlject and admiration 
t.tlat is given to an adult. But, the country had no traditional 
policy to follow, no economic history to draw upon and no desire 
to accept guidance from the older nations of8urope. Her 
14 F.S. Mead, "The Panic and the Banks," Atlantic [,;jonthly, 
101:273, February, 1908 
mistakes were natural, although tragic to those suffering the 
ill-consequences of immature economic navigation. In desper-
ation, t he national government called uron reserves it did not 
possess, It attempted to Use such non-existent reserves to 
obtain those things it needed. Thus, began the vicious circle. 
This created general uneasiness, "Jealth for ithe fortunate spec-
ulators, debt for the unsuccessful, and utter confusion for 
the majority. Over-spending, over-tradin::o:, over-production, 
over-mining of gold ,_ over-construction, over-expansion by in-
terior railroad building, and over-confidence did not help to 
alleviate the strain. The result naturally Vias the many cycles 
of boom and prosperity followed by panic and derression, only 
again to revert to boom, and the cycle started once more. It 
was at the end of this adolescence that the Panic of I~07 took 
. 
place. The vvri ter does not T!lTis 11 to convey the idea t nat these 
cycles are a thing of the past; but, until this period, not too 
much was done to correct the causes of sue h economic, corr;mercial-, 
and industrial fluctUations. As a result, measures were taken 
to prevent rather th:-:m ease the ill-effects of financial qis-
aster in so far as they were able. 
Adolescence 1s a d.elicate time of life when 
habits, attitudes, and general all around mental as well as 
/ 
• 
physical health must be thoroughly safep;uarded. Otherwise the 
well-rounded and acijusted adult will not blosSOll1. A nation's 
llfe rpsembles to some extent tnat of t ne ordinary human indi-
vicual. At tins time our nation was a financial adolescent. 
10 
• 
CHAPI'ER II 
THE EVE OF THE OCTOBER PANIC 
Judf,ing from external cond:i.t1ons, 1806 may be con-
sidered a year of great ~rosperity. Commodity prices and the 
cost of living were hi2;h and a construction boom was apparently 
in full force. One reason for this was that builQing had fallen 
since 1804 due to t he extremely high cost of materials. Conse-
quently, people limited t ijemselves to necessary repairs and 
1 
slig11t improvement s. The increased derDana for new construc-
tion projects was modified to a great degree b,i the aj-parent 
unwillingness of investors to risk their money in such a dubious 
venture as real estate at that time. ~)uite natural..Ly, little 
or no actual building construction ViaS undertaken. Prices, how-
ever, slowly lowered and this decline set off the cycle once 
more. Investors were now more than anxious to risk" their money 
in order to reap a rich harvest. The stock piles of building 
materials were slowly exhausted as t.E cycle began to gain mo-
mentum. As a result in t he year 1;J06 t nere were frantic calls 
for materials, workers, and financial assistance. Such invest-
ment construction is usually follo'Yed by a stimulated increase 
1 Hull,180 
11 
~--------------------------------------------------l~-~' 
2 
in necessity construction. T ne tneory is t ,;at proo.uction 
is stimulated anG general business is extenaed to a l)itch of un-
excelled prosperity. But the price of any commoo.ity rei.;ulates 
its selling factor. ::n1.en the demand is satisfied a gradual sur-
pluS is built up; supply t hen exceeds demand and a slackening 
'uerioa sets in after t he levelling off. "),rIlen the payment is 
-" 
halted a natural result is that financial and comwercial in-
terests are accordingly affected. 
It must be borne in mind that the rapid develop-
ment and ecual1y sharp decline in work-promotinp: enterprises is 
most ap;..;arent when viewed objectivply from a vantage point of 
forty years. However, those living at the time are usually not 
able to distinguish tde chGi.nge and e,uite naturally conclude that 
such financial ."'ood times are norE~al ano. 'will continue. 
With tie general advance in construction pros~er­
ity all branches of gaining a livelihood quite naturally are 
stimulated. '1' De general field of entertainment receives more 
than its share of surplus money and as a result stars such as tne 
John Drews and the Mary Gardens rise with tne prices. Clotning 
manufacturers are encouraged to buy more goods as tile demand for 
2 Hull, 180 
.. 
their commodity is increased. T his situation continues to flow 
through the INhole fabric of daily living for peol/le are most 
eager to maintain their station in life. 
The price of food, likewise, soared because tne 
farmer and the grocer insisted upon t 11eir share of the fruits of 
t he apparent prosperity. T he Roosevelt Pure Food Law improved 
service and food in the many restaurants scattered t lJI'oughout 
t ne country. T his was done to such a degree that they were 
patronized much more t llan in previous times. It would be mis-
leading, however, to fail to mention that most entertaining was 
done in the home. This, in turn, necessitated the employment 
of domestic help. Such help was at a premium and as a result 
was in a position to demand niF.':her wages ano. the best in INork-
ing conditions. 
Education, likei:vise, ViTas eX}.Jandea.. l'Jo jJros},Jerous 
~£1ome "yould dare admit that its c hilCl.ren wanted for anyt lung. An 
excellent proof of wealth was t 11e common statement to thee; effect 
that the children attended this or that expensive ana exclusive 
school. 
When the head of t ne family possessed sufficient 
resources to live on a hig her level t rlan his fat her, when nis 
children are well fed, clot fled, educated, and given every pos-
sible opportunity to advance, when he has a sur 1)lus whic 11 would 
enable him to dabble in stocks and bonds, then is he lulled into 
a feeling of security in which the very idea of l~:ersonal disaste 
to him and his is utterly abhorrent. Such an attitude of mind 
was far too general at this time and must biC' understood in order 
that the entire spirit of the period in question be not uncom-
prehensible. Disaster was 'waiting just around the corner for an 
opportunity to raise its ugly head and start the chaos that is a 
natural consequence of the fact that its warnings have been ig-
nored. 
On an early spring day, April 8, 1906, one year 
and a half previous to the bursting of the Panic in all its 
fury, a'terrible disaster took place on the Pacific ,Coast. On 
that day the city of San Francisco was utterly destroyed by an 
earthquake and subsequent fire resulting therefrom; the loss in 
human life was hig h for any city. Millions and millions of 
dollars in proI.:;erty values went up in smoke or had been shaken 
apart by the earthquake. The insurance companies bore the full 
impact of the losses resulting from the earthquake and fire. 
Disaster as well as war drain a nation's finances. Money, cap-
ital~ and property are destroyed. The disaster in San Francis-
co shook the financial fabric of the nation. It was a most un-
fortunate occurrence but not the direct cause of the Panic as 
Sprague points out: 
••• but even if it [the 'Quake] 
r~d not occurred it is certain 
t hat demand for adciitional cap-
ital ~vas outstriiJl~ing current 
savings seeking investment. In-
creasing difficulty was experi-
enced in marketing securities 
of the very hiehest class. By 
some ••• this difficulty was 
attributed to the activities of 
the national and state governments 
designed to regulate corporations; 
but it can hardly be supposed 
t hat this surerficial view blind-
ed those in responsible positions 
in the financial world. The strain 
upon capital Was world-wide, and 
in the United States mu..nicipal 
bonds whose sale would. have been 
stimulated ••• co~ld only be 
marketed when offered at 100'!er 
prices or a higher rate of interest. 3 
During the summer r:lonths, however, stocks and 
bonds began to move again to higher grolLn.ds • Dividends 1.'IJere 
rather high and this Tl\!as all the assurance SIJeculators had to 
have in order to stimulate investments. T he large banks began 
to receive capital from the smaller banks and the money in 
3 Sprague~ Crises~ 239 
rF 
r 
circulation was thereby increased. A large number of the in-
vestment establishments in t rle financial calJitol received the re-
quired reserve cal)ital from outlying community banks. These, in 
turn, felt themselves to be secure since their reserves had been 
placed in famous New York institutions of banking and invest-
4 
mente Almost fifty-four millions of dollars had been secured 
through the importation of gold. 'I'lus was brought about through 
the negotiation of finance biJ..ls and the entire rflovement was ( 
eased to a great degree by deposits of funds of the government i 
the banks against the gold. Even the crop-moving demands were 
successfully .met by the financial circles in New York without 
suffering too much loss. Some increase loomed on the horizon, 
but by December the stock market began to decline. As a conse .... 
Quence, very stringent money conQitions returned. 
T he year, 1807, opened brightly with the hope that 
the beginning of the new year would be marked by an increased 
flow of money into New York. The New York banks, however ,. soon 
found themselves in a difficult Fosition of being forced to make 
4 Money in circulation increased nearly ~;100,000,OOO. Del;osits 
in New York banks reduced the Treasury Department's holG.ings 
$23,000,000. "State and other bonds 1J.rere accepted as security 
for such deposits on condition tl~_t the banks should use the 
re.leased United States bonds on a basis for further issues of 
notes. If Sprague, 240 
17 
.. 
loans on t ne very loans which they had already nef,otiat ea'. Such 
jUf':'-',l.ing of f·..mas resulted in double 1iqtliaation ami brou,-; ilt 
about the If Rich Men's Panic ll of February ana. j!larch, Itl07. As a 
writer in the IJ~j:;ion points out this type of panic is II ••• con-
ceived of as forced selJ.im-.r of stocks by cCi}iitalists woo are so 
rich that tneir cre,dt cannot be toucnec.l, ann wilo are merely 
cOlni~lelled to reo.uce the burd(~n vlflich the] are (~arr.ving v.rith 
5 
bo:croVJed money. II f.iuch a pan.ic occurs 1:'!nen the stock n:S1.rket 
seems to i_romise an extensive rise. The sf;ecuJ.ator purc.cases 
more stock with t ne i(1ea in mind of unloading such stock W'ien 
,Jrices reac t-J a ni~ ner level. T he reason tnis type of person 
bcrrov!s money from t ne banks is due to t 1:18 fact t nat most of nis 
'wealth is tied up in l"md, private business, and Dis regular 
stocks and bonds. Rat her t nan selling t ! .. lose tnin<s \~rnich he 
knows are safe ana souna in order to get the necessary fu..nds, ne 
proceeds to borrow on t ne fact of his well established Gred.it. 
Such financial manil-lulation is quite easily arranged. The spec-
ulator simply l:Jledges ills real inv f0stments as Gollateral. This 
way he may borro';r,r enough mon~:'y to plunge into speculative stocks 
of doubtful value. He may even go one step furtller anu. invite 
disaster by;",J.eciging nis new' pure (lases and t nus siJeeulate 
furt [leI'. In present day terms tnis is simply buyin2: on margin 
5 "A Rich Men's Panic," Nation, 84:254, JViareh 14, 1907 
'f 
18 
<".no i'1. our ()1"n time lve rl(-3,Ve exr.;eri""[lJ:!eo (3 too, too :;i:-J.i.!lfl.ll re-
suIt of such fin8.Ylcial lep;er(ieElain. 
':,,?l.l he st;-l.nds to IT',':d-(p a very Fl~ood )rcfit. If the ice of nis 
s2'ecul!:!ted stock rer8ins con~3tCJ,nt to b rp.Lb.tive cJegl'ee h"" is 
the .NEJ.tion correctly st:-l.t.es: 
But, if he .l.l.(C,S wholly ul.l.sjU( en 
the m2rket; if the 1,r5.c!?, hOT.h 
of the n""~iTly-"ou:.~ nt stocl< ,gn(' of 
the olde=;r holdtJ1e:s ••• ;ut U1; ;,s 
collateral, falls ten OJ' tvrpnty 
percent O!1 the Stoc}r :~xc;l;mp'e=;, 
thp ••• million (oll;,;.r 0 ,,',::ere.t or 
is Quite as much forced to 'Lioui-
date' as is the petty s~eculator 
ca1J.f~h.t wit n::ln 'PXI18uste=;O i(18Tgin'. 
• ••• SmalJ. s~ ecul8.tors c,c;ug.ht ••• 
soon reac h thp end of tkleir resources 
and are 'closed out', leavin:-:; no 
f:1orro forcer:!. sr:iles 1:; 0 C0i1e I'ror" 
that ClU)::.rter. The t.::n-milJ.ion-
dollar r.1an, ••• may rrLise suf:L'i ~ient 
c2sh, by sales on the Stock 'M,xchani:e 
to reduce bis debt 2..:r]/; )rotect till=; 
bulk of his sj,e=;cul;.:;ti ve ve=;''}'cures • 
• •• hJs sale of stocks 1,,,ril.L not only 
be 10ng-contj.l11J.Pd, but will be of a 
P1c,gnitude:.)roortionen to tl'l2..t of 
;~is s,;eclJ.lati ve comni tr;p:nt s. 6 
Of course money is lost, hut his .s, pCld.,c:,tions ,He S () :re",t th2.t 
visible=; SJ_i!,ns of individual distress or s.hal~y r:redi t ale 1.2.cl{int~ 
6 "A Rich j"'en' s PBnic, tI 254 
.. 
This in a word is a "Rich Men's Panic." 
This "HichMen's Panic fl may be summarized as fo1-
lows: the sl;eculators were the largest buyers following the 
August dividend's go-ahead signalj these men misjudged the mar-
ket conditions; and, t he public did not purchase the stocks so 
7 
financially mani)ulated. In a country where almost seventy-
five per cent of the business is carried on a cas n basis, such 
a panic merely brings about an already overly aggrivated money 
8 
shortage. 
7 "A Rich Men's Panic," 254 
8 This 1Nill be brought out more clearly in Chapter III where 
the "run" on the banks is explained in detail 
CRAPrER III 
QCTOBER, 1907 
• 
The year 1906 gave ample eviaence of tile aPiiroach-
ing financial storm but such evidence was ignored by the major-
i ty of ~:)eo'ple throughout the cOll..n.try. Speculators, both large 
ana small, felt no com:;.mlsion to taper off t (;eir wild purchas-
ing on slim margins. To complicate matters, expert opinion in 
Europe was over-confident that the finanr::ial. viTOrld in Amerlca 
was sound. European financiers were not slow in extending 
1 
credit to Americans. It is e?-sy to unoerstand then the 
events vyhi8h reached t LeiI' cJ.imax in October, 1907. 'I' .nrough 
world-wide economic madness, the results could not nave been 
ot~,erwise. The unfolding of these events should not cause any 
Shock for tiSY had been foreshadowed long before tIE Panic 
really began. 
The first sign of trouble came 
when Cnar les W. l:!iOrSe, notable as 
tIle constructor of a great ice com-
pany and the projector of a chain 
of banks, E.R. Thomas, a young and 
daring financier, and F. Augustus 
Heinze, an engineer wno had gained 
faille and fortune by his dealings in 
copper, suddenly withdrew from the 
1 Berlin Corresponaence, New York ~yening Post, July 21, 1906, 
Financial Section, 1 
20 
db"ection of the group of banks 
which they controlled. 2 
21 
There was a strong rumor that t he Clearing nouse 
3 
Committee had dictated this move. TiIDse involved denied 
this and stated ttat the changes were caused by t eir voluntary 
action in order t hat they might devote t .£ir full energies to 
4 
their personal interests. According to a headline appearing 
in the New York 'l'imes we read t tat II Heinze's Coppers Dance Up 
-5- -_ .. __ . 
and Do·wn. It On October 17 the financial page carried these 
news leads "Brokerage House Fails. Stock Exc hange Firm Sus-
6 
pends Following United Cop~8r' s 'Wild Course •••• II If any 
added proof were needed more information was given on the 18th, 
relative to the Clearing House's aid to t be Mercantile National 
and the entire front page s;read concerned itself with convey-. 
8 
ing the information t rat all 1.'iould be well. 
Financial uneasiness began to spread while the 
2 ili.Jilliam Inglis, "Reaping the Whirlwind, New York's Escape 
from Bank Panic,1t J:-i..arper's Weekly, 51:1646, November 9, 1907 
3 See Chapter V 
4 Inglis, 1646 
5 The Mercantile' s deposits amounted to ~~11,500, 000, New York 
Times, October 16, 1907, 13 
6 Ibid., October 17, 1907, 12 
7 Ibid., October 18, 1807, 13 
8 T he press had advertized poor financial conditions too well. 
Opinion was given that their policy better change to a more 
confidence promoting attitude before it was too late 
22 
Clearing House Committee was conducting its investigation. iNnen 
the newspapers devulged a few facts of t cis inquiry in relation 
to the misuse of invested ca[)ital, then the bankers became 
alarmed. In little time all institutions having financial neal-
ing s with t 118 board of directors of the suspect bank began 
checking t ,eir records. quite naturally t neir de;Jositors were 
deeply concerned. T 11ese "vere divided into two groups; the sus-
ricious ann cautious w.no drew out tneir savings before ti1es"Corm 
broke; and the trustful souls 'WilO believed that prosperity was 
permanent and so no harm would corne to a financial institution 
9 
just because it was under investigation. 
snortly after, Charles T. Barney, wno had been an 
associate of t ne Morse group, resigned as presiCient of t lle 
10 
Knickerbocker Trust Company. This only added fuel to tl1e 
fire. At the close of t ":e business day, October ~;1, the l~a­
tional Bank of Commerce formally announced it would not accept 
11 
c necks drawn on the Knickerbocker Trust. That evening a 
group of bankers held a meeting at Sherry f s Restaurant and 
spent t heir time deliberating t ne fate of the Knickerbocker 
9 The Mercant ile was t ll.e second largpst of its kind in New York 
City 
10 IngliS, 1646 
11 Ne~ York Times, October 22, 1807, 1 
';:, 
23 
• 
12 
Trust until the early morning hours. In order to save face, 
t [lis group guaranteed the huge sum of :$15,000,000 to tide the 
strugr:ling institution over its financial storm. The mox'ning 
palJers, however, carried the news in full detail. The riublic 
becarlle alarmed upon reading the story. Hours before the 1nicker 
bocker Trust opened its doors on the 2i:.:,nci, a long line of order-
ly though thorouGhly anxious depositors\"Jere l=atiently waiting 
to withdraw their money. TIns was the first actual and real in-
dication that the Panic WB.S underway 'when the general public 
showed signs of its lack of confidence in t.he l<nickerbocker 
13 
Trust. The line of hopeful yet fearful de..':)ositors extended 
14 
for blocks and during the long perio6 of waiting it beca~e 
necessary for the New York City police to issue numbered cards 
so that those wishing to take time off to eat might return again 
15 
to their place in the long l:lne. 
By half-past one o'clock 
that afternoon [October ~?8J the 
Kniekerbocll:er Trust COtlp8.ny had 
paid out nearly ~~8, 000,000 of 
its own money, and the run of 
eager depOSitors was as insis-
tent as ever. :tifo help was forth-
c,oming from other banks [the 
$15,000,000 pro~ised the night 
U~ Inglis, 1646; Ne\! York Times, October 22, 1~07, 1 
13 Alexander D. Noyes, "The Financiol Panic j.n the United 
states," Forum, 39:293-294, January, 1~08 
14 See App~llaix B. . I5 Noyes, .t"l.nancl.al Panic, n 294 
before could not be raised 
and cash was no where to be 
found J. The officers of the 
,company, ordered all payment 
stopped. The business of the 
concern was indefinitely 16 
sus pended • The news vms knovm 
instantly allover tOl.m. Blind, 
unreasoning fear s>read every-
where. 17 
October 22 was a day to be remembered in the 
18 
24 
financial world. The flow of call money to the threatened 
banks was spasmodic and even the President's speech at Nash-
ville did little or nothing to alleviate the seriousness of the 
19 
situation. 'The next morning a !lrun ff began on the Trust 
20 
Company of America and its branch, the Colonial Trust Company. 
The newspapers, through their adverse criticism" had played a 
leading part in bringing forth the full force of the scare. 
They were advised to tone dov<!l'l their news stories. If they had 
not such warning there is little likelihood that the ~New York 
Times on October 23 would have carried a front page spread as-
suring its readers that the situation '.,ras 'well in hand and would 
16 New Xor~ .Tj:.:~, October 23, 1807, 1 
17 Inglis, 1648 
18 N~_l~ Xm:li}~.1:;nw~~, October 23, 1807, 5, 15; "Exeunt Hoosevel t 
and Bryan/, ft H?-.r..pe!:_!_§. .}~eeKhy., November 9, 1907, 51: 1640-1642, 
stressed t he fact that tf:le President knew of the ap~Jroach­
ing Panic but was determined to carry out his stubborn pol-
icies 
19 New Yo~~ Times, October 23, 1907, 1 
20 Ibig. 
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25 
¥ 
be cleared Uf' shortly throu?;h the efforts of J. P. l!lorgaTI and his 
fri'?nds. 
At this time it may be stated th3,t the statutes 
chartering trust companies made no provisions for them to per-
form a general business or to accept demand 6.e~)osits from the 
public. No cas b reserve 'was necessary to be used against tlJe 
deposits and these companies livere legally able to invest in real 
estate, deal in buying and selling stocks, and to lend money on 
21 
real estate. Such privileges had been denied to delJosit 
banks and these 'were carefully checked to see that there Vlerp. no 
infringements. Insurance companies, likewise, vrere not restrict-
ed and t hey wit h the trust companies were free in their movements 
in financial affairs. Together they covered any requirements 
made of tnem by depositing their reserve capital in banks. These 
bankS, however, were only E;uaranteed twenty-five :per cent of the 
total sum. In tnis manner, liabilities were protected according 
to technical means but the wholE'? cre,dt system was entirely too 
broad and loose to vvi t;hstand any unforseen bloV'T on the finan-
cial drop. 
Another important fact 1!ifaS that the trusts were 
21 Banking Law of New York State, Article IV, Section 156 
26 
able to clear, or exchange checks throu~~h the facilities of the 
Clearing House, even though they were not members. It was in 
this manner that the National Bank of Commerce was ablA to refus 
any further clearing for the Knickerbocker Trust Company. 
oresidents 
x 
On Wednesday, October 23, a committee of five bank 
22 
was formed "to receive applications for as-
sistance, make examinations, and rel)Ort to meetings of all trust 
23 
companies." T he foundation of this committee helped to bul-
wark the sagl,);ing spirits of an already disheartened population. 
This was one instance where the bankers were truly honest and 
helpful. The co~mittee was ahle to transfer money in large 
amo1L'1ts. Bonds were deposited by tile trusts; these were turned 
over to national banks which, in turn, used them for additional 
24 
government deposits. 
On Thursday, however, this situation grew very 
serious. As a rule panics subside after a few i1ectic hours but 
this one continued to grow worse. T De part of t ne Stock Exchang 
22 The loan committee consisted of James Cannon, Vice-president 
of Fourth National Bank; Henry Davidson, Vice-president of 
First National Bank; Walter Frew, Vice-president of Corn Ex-
change Bank; Gates McGorrah, President of l'IIecilanics National 
Bank; and, Albert "\:1liggins, Vice-president of Chase National 
Bank 
23 Sprague, 254 
24 Ibid. 
~----------------------------------~2~7 
in the Panic brings this picture into much clearer focus. The 
busiest part of the Stock Exchange is the "money post It vlhere 
loans of cash are made. This is usually the most crowded place 
in the entire building. On Tuesday, October 22, no loans were 
made before noon and on the next day there was no business at 
all. Thursday was the most nerve \\Tackin..g day in the Exchange's 
history up to that time, as the market was verging on sheer 
25 
panic. At this very critical time the entire financial 
structure of the Exchange was saved tem~.orarily through the 
26 
combined efforts of J.P. Morgan and his associates. They 
placed ~~25,OOO,000 into the money market. A fel'v moments Vre-
viously small amounts of call money b8came available and these 
were bringing 120 per cent interest. Relief aP.;Jeared just in 
27 
time. 
Meanwhile, George B. Cortelyou, Secretary of the 
Treasury, boarded a train for New York and when he arrivea per-
sonally deposited $25,000,000 of the Treasury surplus with 
25 Inglis, 1649 
26 "The Men Who Saved the Day, ff HarDer' ~ VlTeekly, 51: 1646, Novem-
ber 9, 1907 lists George F. Baker, Dumont Clarke, Alonzo l~p­
burn, William Nash, Thomas Ryan, James Stillman, and J.P. Mor-
gan as the financial saviors 
27 Inglis, 1649 
28 New York Times, October 24, 1907, li but, Noyes, "Financial 
Panic," states that the amount was ;W40,OOO,OOO 
28 
• 
the national banks. On t hat same day, J,![r. Rockerfeller stated, 
29 
III propose to do my part to t :ne full extent of my resources. n 
Yet, this extra aid, was not sufficient, though it was a life-
saver to some extent. The banks were unable to n1F;et the heavy 
30 
withdrawls demanded of them and began to stall payments. It 
waS their clear-cut intention to make a long dra1Jm out process 
of what ordinarily VI"ould consume a few minutes. In t[US way the 
banks iNould still be functioning but the cash turn-over would 
not amount to much. It must be remembered that the heavy demand 
for cash precluded the rec'3.iition of new depOSits. As a result, 
all the money was being withdrawn and. none vms being deposited. 
Hence, precious time, as well as money, was extended. To add to 
the utter confusion anti turmoil, tIle small inland banks became 
Dighly concerned over the status of their reserves "which they 
placed in reputable Ne lN York banking institutions for safe keep-
ing. They began to nave "runs" in their local communities and 
called for t he reserves held in TJew York. T Ins state of affairs 
made it necessary for tne New York banks to insist on a sixty 
day notice before they would return any deposits. T Ius occurred 
on Saturciay, October 26, just four days after the "run!! on the 
Knickerbocker. Saving banks issue6. a formal notice to the effect 
29 Noyes, "Financial Panic," 299 
30 Ibid. 
that only after a si:z:ty day notice "wulct depo~itors be able to 
witfJdraw t heir money. Consequently, a large percentage of the 
money deposited would be tied up; the Panic would have time to 
31 
subside; thus, the 'zeneral rush could be eased. 
When cash becBn:e short, many dire conse(~uences fol-
29 
lowed. Some shrevrd people wrote checks instead of making direct 
al'plication to the banks for their money. In this manner the 
fortunate and particularly promin~mt depositors Viera sllccessful 
in obtaining their IlJoney during the first day of the "run It • The 
large trust corrrpanies sent messengers to secure their reserves 
32 
lvhich they had kept in lochl associate trust institutions. 
J.~aturally, these were given every IJreference and by the time the 
regular, small dei!Ositor reached the teller's cage most of the 
available money had disappeared. 
It is only too true that when a shortag~ of ready 
cash occurs those who possess it naturally hold on. In this 
vvay hoarding J:.ilayed a prominent part. The fortunate de})ositors, 
31 Noyes, "Financial Panic~n 300 
:32 Messengers were necessary as the Clearing J:-iouse Association 
had refused since 1802 to allow all trusts the privileges ex-
tended to members. Therefore, non-members were forced to re-
vert to the ancient practice of sending messengers to casn 
checks if the Association refused to grant tl1.em t.rus service 
~~----------------------------~~-.... --~~\ \' 
lacking faith and confidence in banking institutions, were 0.8-
33 
termined to hold tight until concH tions werp corr8cted. 
30 
T riree immediate res1..uts followeQ fror::l this. First, the hoard.ing 
of money; secondly, tne offering of 8. lJre!:'ium for currency; and 
34 
t nirdly, the issllCJ..nce of C1eA.ring House certificates. 
Betv.reen August and December of 1907 a sum in ex-
35 
cess of 2~~0 millions disap}jeareci from the banks. This huge 
amount was not hoarded by timid dej-ositors, but by the peoJ.Jle 
as a 1Jirhole. The fRar t ha.t a s nortage in r')cney would ret ;.'1 .. rd the 
merc::ting of normal obligations was distressing. T he Comptroller 
of the Currency reported tll8.t banks outside of the cen"Lral re-
serve cities were able to gather extra reserves of cash tirrough 
36 
the nation-wide partial suspension of payment. "The banks 
of the ::Jouthern, Western, and Pacific States '[Jere the rforst of-
fenders •••• (They] ••• more t h~ln doub1~d t he amount of cash 
37 
reo.uired by the law." 
33 The Astor Safe Compa.ny rented 789 safes during the first week 
of t [Ie Panic or six times their normal amount, A. Platt An-
drew, IIHoarding in the Panic,tt quarterly Journal of Economics, 
22:294, February, 1908 
34 Tr~se certificates are discussed in detail in Chapter V 
35 Andrew, "Hoarding," 294 
56 Report of the ComptrolJ_~ of t l1e Curr8ncy, 1907, 1;'ashington, 
1907, 69-71 
37 Andrew, ft Hoar6ing," 299 
. \:.::. 
• 
With the withholding from circulation of such 
large amount s of ready cash, it became neces sary for t fle is-
suan~e of premiums for curre::1.t~y. This is nothing but bla.ck 
market 03)eration. This means that cash holders were encouraged 
to bring forth their rnoney from their private vaults and llUt it 
:~8 
in circulation after they had bec.>n given an extra bonus. 
39 
On Novep1ber 12, t he premiums were ,as hig h as four per cent. 
Despite all the pressure to pr9vent or break up such hoarding, 
little cash was obtained from such premiums. Cas n 1f.Ti:iS scarce 
and anyone fortunate enough to have it, was determined to kee.p 
it, four i)er cent or no four per cent. 
In regard to Clearing House certificates and con-
ditions of the banks, full details will be given and ex~lained 
in a subsequent chapter concerning the great debate on those 
31 
institutions and J.~ersons who contributed most toward alleviating 
~he deplorable situation. 
It fol101","S, naturally, that when a shortase of 
money occurs business necessa.rily becOD1es forced to susiiend 
38 See Appendix C 
39 "Disa.ppearance of the 'Premium on Currency'," Nation, 86:44, 
January, 1908 
operEltions as well as the banks. This d0velops into an ensuin8 
depression. The time of the Panic, hov,rc,ver, found the average 
wage winner worldng but not paid. His sfl.vings 'were tieduj.J be-
cause of the banks r closing; his credit almost disa~ .. lIje::'tred. 
With the 11.71101,::: e80nomic stru8ture under fire, the 
logi8,'J .. l question in everyone T s mind vIas, who are the guilty? 
After the first shock carne the c:uestion of "That must be done to 
correct the situation? And as in all matters human, the third 
question w:nich followed 1~as, who did the most to solve the first 
two? 
CHAPTER IV 
~ 
'~\iHAT CAUSED ':tHE IJANIC? 
~~o.ny w-riters at t:n.e time l)lacen. full res.or\sibil-
ity for the finan~ial Panic solely u:)on the banks. The f13.grant 
J:"isuse of banking privile;res by Horse ",till serve as an (:;xcellent 
example of 1.',That tnese yTrit'?rs had in mind. 
By sp.curing 10~3ns on the colj.ateral of one bank's 
sto~k, he used this Y!1oney to pl.1rchase stock in another bank. 
Tnrough this method he vvas able to control at least a half dozen 
1 
banks. Through fin~mcia.l manipulation of tilis kind the de-
;.'osits of the banks he (!ontrolled vrere used by him in a series of 
g8.mbling and s"eculc:.1.t;i ve deals with o.ire ~onse(:uen~es. Tne btock 
Exchange as a result I:'ras thrown into a state of nec.:..r-.lxmic. 
But it must be ~e>inte(). ow:; that j,;orse alone was 
not a.ble to bring about the entire uptJeaval in New York. ot 11ers 
vrere ec~ually guilty. The bankers risked their de.posits on vihat-
ever sui tea their personal ideas vvi thout rec;ard to tne financial 
risks involved. Feel est8.te was the bulk of tDe banl<:ers' in-
vest8d money. Of course real estj.te provides ;-1 sma.ll .trofit. 
1 "Corrupt Banking and the Pani~, T! Nation, 87: 40::::, October ~:;j, 
1908 
2 
~~ uTwo Causes of the Financial CollrJ}.)se, IT Nation, 85:598, Decem-
ber 26, 1907 
33 
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Furthern"ore, even a supposer"ly S8 f8 reserve of 1'i VA to e uoven 
,I?T cent turned out to be inadec;uate even though it W2.S thought 
~3t the time to be safA. T he country banks '1 eposi tAd in hew York 
City three-fifths of their fifteen per cent which was the cash 
renuired to be on hand. In turn, thr> l8rp:e trust co[[:;;anies 
S!:1 C:c.l Ler bc:nks and the trust corniJa.nies 1";::tS such that each de-
4 
ended on t .'ll? cre0.i t of anothpJ'. It is patent then that such 
r/?,liance of one bEi.nk 11);011 another for re-G0J)ositl?o reserve 'Has 
post dangerous. Each instlt'ltion, by using t ne rpservp capital 
of another bank deposited in it for sl)eculation and unsound 
loans naturally left the depositinp banks with little or no cap-
i tal. Thus 'rhen the Panic broke upon the ftnancial rIOT'1d few 
hanks had sufficient reserves. It was just a C,'lse of not fol-
lowing the' stipulations of the National Banldng Law 1'I.'ruch re-
(ntred a t".renty-fi ve per cent reserve. If tnere hact been only 
a fellt offenders in this regard, then in all l~robability there 
would !lB.ve been no Panic or at least one of very snort duration. 
But such 1":::).8 not the c!=J.se. As Spraizue so cleci.rly }Joint s out: 
ItThe normal CO'i1{~i t ion of tIl8 banks l'.rpS one of lack of:JI'e}'aration 
for emergencies. No adecuate lending power or surplus cash 
3 lfThe Aftermath of Panic, II Natio!1, 85:454, j\iovember 14, 1;;)07 
4: Ibid. 
I~ 
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reserve was avaL ... able at any time except during periods of trade 
5 
depression •••• " This was the only time that the banks had 
feper borcovrrers ;:mr5. sUrl)lus cash. Generally, it was felt t Dat 
this was the ccndltion ann nothing could be done about it. Tne 
bi:nkS '''forked under [~ handic01.p 8.nd did not r('8.1ize it to it s 
f1J.llpst extent. 
Ultimately, the PA.nic of 1907 "'8.S 2:ood for the 
hanks. It showed clearly that .in an errerp;r->ncy the bFE1ks pere 
snPllosed to do t 1rJO things: first, to be 8ble to rr;eet all demands 
for llTithdra1Hl; and seconr-J...y, to increase its 10:1ns. .subsequent 
financj ... al conditi0l1S jJrevl'mted the banks fro)':1 8cr~ui.r:i.ng new de-
)()c:;itors. 1I11hen these conditions were not [IlF:'t, 11<"'0-,:le den1A.ll.oAO 
th8.t the banl-{s be refor[.;ed. At the time of Panic, however, thpre 
was much (jj.scl)ssion but little action. 
It may be o"':estioned 'xhy ttl<" crisis oeveloped 
and c"-mtered in NeT York. ..rhis is e;:l.sily explained by the fact 
thFl.t t he trusts were incorporated emd confinerl thpir financiA.l 
i'~ctivity in New York. "Its J,roxin;ity to BurOI)ean bankj ... ng centprs 
rlaced it in a most advantageous spot; even Canadian investors 
f,=-,und its location rnost convenient. Yet 1lTe b':::'d.r in ;, ind ths.t, 
although the Pa.nic bei:;:on, in New' York, it did not confine il,self 
5 Sprague, 216 
36 
.. 
to that city. Chapter VI deals with the geographi~ location 
of this' 1.lVorld-wide financial condition. 
The bankers themselves feared a financial crash 
before the generaltlublic became suspicious. As a result t ney 
cornered all the available money they could and held on to it. 
In a word, the bankers became tie first hoarders. T heir next 
step was the flat refusal to repay their depositors. Under 
such conditions, business in general could no longer secure 
loans 8.-"Yld thereby was unable to fun.ction properly. 1;\Then busi-
ness fell off, the bankers thus injured tneir own cause. No 
financial institution can endure over a long period when fresh 
money is not available. In regard to foreif,n loans, t nese uis-
appeared when American credit disappeared. As a result, Eur-
opean trade fell off when American business slu~ped. 
When the New York bankers had expanded to an un-
sound financial ;condition theY were naturally forced to call 
in their loans. This action forced the borrmvers against a 
financial 1Nall. Since United states' banking laws did not re-
quire a set ratio bet1Neen the bank's capital and its liabilitie 
6 
over-expansion was only natural. In such a situation 
6 Joseph F. Johnson, flT.he Crisis and Panic of 1907, fI Political 
Qcience~~~, 23:459, 1908 
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aaenuate lending power or surplus c&sh woul6 not be available. 
To COIniJlicate matters even ft:trt 1191', t ,1.e 0.e1_osi tor 
b;c,nks demandeu t neil' money just as the I! run II on the New York 
banks was at its )eak. In a desire to shift the blame, the i~ew 
Yorkers castigated the del-i0si tor banlrs and~)articularly t nose in 
7 
t he West. As to the fairness of this we are not concerned. 
The practice of depositing reserves in banks of other ci~ies 
was a rather duhious venture at the time. As a writer in the 
Hatton points out: 6,178 of the 6,544 national banks were 'vhat 
is termed 'country banks'. These had to deiiosit trlree-fift 1.1S 
8 
of their fifteen per cent which was a re(uired reserve. In 
order to secure their business the l::trge city banks offered to 
lAY in.ter'est on this reserve so t hey might us'" it for their ovm 
l!1.J.rl'Ose. As a result ~;420, 000, 000 "ras I)laced on dellosi t in large 
cities and ~201,OOO,000 was kept as cash on hand to meet the de-
9 
f:1!::mos of local dp~:'ositors. Since the Ne,cr York h8.nks had lent 
",ost of the, cas h belonging to def·osi tor banks they 1~!ere naturally 
10 
unable to meet the hurTied call ror such money. 
7 "Who Was FiespoYls.ib1e for the Panic'?," Nation, 85:575, December 
19, 1907 
8 "The Panic of 1907," Nation, 86: 51, January H3, ID08 
9 Ibid. 
10 Alexander D. Noyes, "Recovery from the .nec':;nt Panic," Forum, 
39:483, April, 1908 
I~ 'f 
1".ihen t he Panic broke , it s full f(\r(~e fell u.;;;on 
t (,e nation81 banks And in particular on tllose located in cen-
tr8l reserve cities. Tile holdings of all national bc<nks FJere 
not sufficient. It amounted to less tn.an ;:;',1700,000,000 as t.clead 
. t tilt [ley V"ere li3.01e to_ be cr:.l18d on for :.:;" :-';50,000, pOll1 s ou: ••• 
000 del.-;osits of banks of their own class, an.d also ~(:~480,OOO,000 
de.)oslts of thl? state banks, )""lot to nention the ~nOO,OOO,OOO 
11 
(:~erosits of tne saving be.nks. II It was never intended that 
ti~ national banks were to share the benefits or obligations of 
tne trust or sElal..Ler banks' resi1onsibilities. Hence, they were 
not er;ui.rJped to meet the serious dema.nds placed u.J..,on them. 'The 
38 
J:'1ational banks carried the de)osits of the state banks' reserve. 
~hy such a situation was ever allowed to develop in the first 
place is a more ir'J)ort2nt ('uestion than the locl:!.tion of the 
st::lte barLl{s' money. '1.' nis is the reason w'fly bank reforrf'ers de-
manded two separate banks, clearly disti::1ct or one bank 11.'herein 
12 
full res ~onsi bili ty could be p12.ced. Sprague felt that 
even '':il-h emerf:ency measures it v!oulri have been (~Hi te iF~~ oS3i ble 
for the national banks to meet their full r;:;sl-,onsibility. he 
L3 
advocated reforms. In a~l fairness, it is a Question 
11 F. S. J\Tead, nThe Panic and the Banks, tI Atl antic J:!:onthly, 
101:275, February, 1908 
12 Ibid., Nelson W. Ale.rich, 'I'h~ 1Nork of the J'~ational Fonetarv 
Commission, 61 Congress, 2 session, Senate DocuP.1l?nt 406, iNas (J-
ington, 1909, 15 
13 SiJrague, ;:-~16-3:::!l 
, 
" 
,. 
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l'Jnether or not the banks should receive so large a sl1are in the 
b.Lame for the Panic of 1907. The banking laws as I'Jell as the 
bank managers should s r.l8.re in carrying t he blame. T tIe bankers 
knew full well that business could not possibly be stable while 
t j:lere was a lack of reserves and it was (or them to see t nat 
comprehensive laws shoulo. be passed safe-guarding t.i1e banking 
business. They had the best opportunity to discover where the 
weaknesses were and what remedies could be employed to dissipate 
such weaknesses. It is amazing hoTJv suctl unscrupulous people 
could ever acrueve such resyonsible yositions of trust. Vfuen 
t 'ney do then the blame falls u~_on t hose in charge of trusted 
financial institutions for their utter failure to carryon tneir 
work with that integrity, honesty, and public interest so neces-
sary in their position. Making due allowance to human frailty 
it is peculiar that the majority of the bank managers at that 
time possessed such a low degree of ~ersonal honesty. 
Many people blamed politicians in general and tne 
14 
PreSident, Theodore Roosevelt, in particular. Some believed 
that his trust breaking tactics le~d many businessmen to the 
stubborn conclusion tmt it would be a good lesson to his admin-
istration if a public panic should occur. Though the source 
14 "Who Was ResponSible," 575 
rr---" ------------------
~ 
" 
.' 
1!'lriters of the time 00 not put t r!is in so many words, they do 
state it. 
15 16 
"T.he notion of a 'Roosevelt panic' 
17 
seems 
not to have passed into folk-lore •••• ;" and, "Politically, 
18 
Mr. Roosevelt will be held responsible II are but a 
few of the commentaries. The Nation's financial writer seems 
strike a fairly accurate explanation Vrflen h(~ stated that much 
mud-ttlTowing is exchanged during a presidential election year. 
This is only too true. It might even ino.icclte that the finan-
cial slump may have been the normal tapering off of business 
which is all too common during a campaign year. The usual 
reason for this is that Big Business wants to hold off until 
the election returns are settled. It may even be stated that 
the autumn of a presidential election year is one of watchful 
waiting. fuwever, many blamed Roosevelt as the chief cause of 
the Panic in view of his prosecution of the trusts, his J,Jrogram 
of railroad regulations, his backing of the o.emands of labor 
against capital , and lns conservation program designed to stop 
Big Business' exploitation of natural resources. hoosevelt in 
turn accused the trusts, t he bankers, t ne railroad. men, and 
other exploitprs of causing or aiding in the Panic. 
15 Johnson, "Crisis,fI 464; Alexancier D. Noyes,"A Year After the 
Panic of 1907,1t Quarterly Journal of Economics, February, 
1909, 190 
16 "The Roosevelt Panic and Its Predecessor," Harper's Weekly, 
51:1787-1788, December 7, 1907 
17 "Legends of the PaniC," Nation, 87:422, October 28, 1908 
18 "T his Week," 'Nation, 85:433, November 14, 1907 
19 "Panic and Politics, ft Nation, 86: 247, Marc h 12, 1908 
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The President may have given cause for this attack 
through his excited and sweeping comITlents. These should have 
been made with tact and diplomacy or it may be that his advisors 
misinformed him. Regardless of all this, it is quite absurd to 
insist that the banking failure and general speculation were his 
sole reslJonsibility. Because as a writer in the Nation ponders: 
20 
Poosevelt was mistaken but was fundamentaLLy honest. 
Nlany of the dire conseouences of the Panic have 
been attributed to the speculation carried on at the time. To 
gamble with one T s ovm cash is no crime but to take money will-
ingly which belongs to another and use it on highly risky finan-
cial ventures can not be justified. , either ethi(~ally or on 
sound business princirles. It will be only a ([uestion of tiI?e 
until such financial manipulations are discovered. 'l'he risk to 
one T S self and to the entire community can in no V'Jay compensate 
for any possible gains. The speculation in the 1~07 financial 
world most assuredly played an imj ort;::mt role in bringing about 
many of the tragic economic results. 
Another cause of the finan(~ial breakcLO\~m may be 
20 "This 'Week, n Nation, 85: 390, October 31, 1907; Har:per and 
other staunch Republican publications fully accused Roosevelt 
attributed to the curren~y problem. ,"7ith speculators working 
OD credit, with banks conducting business on small re:"erves, 
with the entire l,opulation over-s i:ending , with in(ustry over-
oroctUcing and t.ne nation as a whole over-confident, it is only 
- . 21 
logical that the ~urrency ~ould be jeapordized. Uncier the 
existing curren~y system, however, there was no way for the 
volume of money to be expanded and the banks vv'ere in a way un-
22 
able to help themselves. As J:/arburg says there is no vis-
23 
42 
ible remedy for this difficulty. Many writers of the period 
believed that it was time for a rpwedy to he devised whereby 
~urrency 1TiTould become sOlmder and more flexible in order to give 
24 
so~e elasticity in periods of stress. On the other hand., 
others insisted that the money was sound <md eVAn suggested that 
25 
it had never been in such a stable condition, 
26 
although a 
scarcity did exist. It ap,ears that it was the policy of 
many financial re:porters of the time not to act when in Cioubt. 
;;:1 "Aftermath,n 454; the gold supply increased ::;6,700,000 
22 Ja.mes G. Cannon, "Clearil'1..g Houses and the Currency, n 'l'he Cur-
rency Problem and the Present Financial Situation, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1808, 108 
23 Marburg, 56 
24 "Fina.ncial Conditions and Treasury Action, n Nation, 85: "±86, 
November 28, 1907 
25 Noyes, "Financial Panics," 313 
26 Evidently, Mr. Noyes changed his mind for both attitudes were 
written by him, but for separate publications; "A Year After,ff 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 194 
• 
Fortu..l1ately the nation's legislators ?!ere more interested and 
27 
something was done. At the time there 'VIas a 'powerful pres-
sure group interested in currency reform and this group had the 
backing of the press as a \~rhole. In the months preceding the 
43 
actual Panic much had been printed in the daily papers advocating 
reforms. The pressure had reached such a st:.;.ge in the daily 
press that the whole cur:cency problem was CalH)d into question 
and t au.s the fear wasprorfJoted that disaster was in tile offing 
un.18ss somet hing V'Tere done. T nis in turn may h8.ve increased the 
f8ar which caused the Panic. The platform of t {Jis g;roup con-
sisted of demands for an elastic currency, financial solidarity, 
28 
and a central bank. 
In attempting to discover the causes of the Panic, 
four things have been stressed; namely, tne banks, the PresiClent, 
oV8r-speculation, and the currency_ Many other conditions were 
pr8sent which contributed to the financial d.ebacle, but the four 
E:entioned above are 'the most important. It will be noted that 
of these four, criticism bas been gi vt.'m by the actual observers 
of 'the role played by each. 
27 See Chapter VIII 
?8 Johnson, "CriSis," 464 
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such name cal-Ling '.'las just another vray of hlalJling Bip; Business 
when the real cause~) \TJere too involved to figure out. In at-
teillo,ting to understand such attacks on tnt:; CCil_'italists, one 
thing cornes to mind. The R.oosevelt Acministration ha.d given 
many hard blows to trusts. As a result most peo~le came ~o the 
80nclusion that the trusts Emd the men who controlled them y.'ere 
entirply evil or tney were good men and should be ::,iven their 
just due. Eac 11 group insisted on the validity of its o)inion. 
Those who were in favor of the trusts s~,Jread tile nevrs of the 
beneficial support given to the banks by Big Business. Those 
who disagreed insisted that the trusts brought on the Panic and 
subsequent der'ression. A.s the eetitor of Harper 1 S lt ree'kly states: 
It may ••• be here set down 
••• that the only living man ~ho 
could have prevented ruin ••• was 
J. P:i,erront J-,;;organ, and that even 
he ••• 'Nould rlave been he11Jless 
but for the unqualified support 
rendered by ••• James Stillman, 
George F,. Baker, John D. Rocker-
feller, Thomas F. Tiyan, and the 
two venerable trust presidpnts -
Edward King and Levi· P. l\:Torton. 2 
;Some held, quite strangely, that anything connected viTith finance 
was good. The fev~ banks guilty of s(~uan().eI'ing depositors 1 money 
in unsouno. speculation formed a minority. The majority according 
2 "Exeunt Roosevelt, n 1640 
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to Inglis, were silent. It was fortunate trlat some financial 
leaders possessed s-L~fficient resources ana. sagacity to control 
tile situation; ot herwise the Panic might have been ·imrse but t {ley 
succeded in checking the "runs" on the banks. With the loosening 
of the money situation the crisis ceased and the Panic stopped 
4 
almost as abruptly as it had begun •. Boastfully, those who 
favored the above opinion l:oint out t l1at t he bankers dumped $50, 
5 
000,000 to the government' s ;~~25, 000,000 on the money market 
at the psyc n.ological moment. And t Ius was SUPl:osed to have saved 
the day. 
Of course a third or middle of the road group ex-
isted. They neither condemned nor condoned the financiers. 
Their general reaction was t bat t he financiers' help was wonder-
ful but too good to last. To a gegree they believed that the 
capitalists ,vere sincere when compared to their deplorable 
actions in the panic of 1903. At that time they vied with each 
other to see vTho could ClO the most harm to financially embar-
rassed institutions in order to incor1Jorate t nem into t neir oVlJn 
6 
particular organizations. 
D Inglis, 1646 
4 Ibid. 
5 New York Times, October 24,1 
E:i "Who ,Nas Responsi hIe?," 575-576 
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They believed, furt nermore, that the financiers Vlrere neitner 
t!1e saviors nor tne der:;ons as the pro and con groups insisted. 
'I' /le/ held that they aid give a great mea.sure of financial aid 
to the banks; but pointed out at the same time that t fie interest 
cnarged was exorbitant wnen one consiuers that t[US was an em-
ergency. 
T ne role played by Georce B. Cortelyou, Secretary 
of the Treasury, l·vas exaggerated out of all prol)ortions to its 
real worth. Naturally, the Administration proclaimed this sup-
7 
posed fact that it had saved the day. Before Cortelyou's 
8.ssumption of office, the previous Secretary had left a sur plus 
unaer the heading of cash balance available to be parceled out 
8 
among banks. The recipients of this money never had their 
names published. It seems t.i:1at they were cnosen without any 
r nyme or reason to such a degree t .hat some banks had been given 
8 
deposits equal to or greater than their entire cal)ital stock •. 
7 Harper's Weekly, 51:164:0, November 9, Ib07 publisned a letter 
1II.rritten by President Roosevelt to Cortelyou on October 24,1807 
which stated' in part, n ••• I congratulate 1I10u upon the admir-
able way in whiC(l you have handled the .oresent crisis •••• " 
8 "Washington Notes,n Journal of PQ,.litical Economy, 15:624, De-
cember, 1907 
9 Ibid., immediately following his tenure of office, Shaw entered 
Wall Street as a financier. This clarifies statements of his 
over-friendliness with banking interests 
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It seems that tnere was little need for the bRnks to worry be-
ce.nse they had been assured that the money would only be called 
for i!l o.n errergency, and t hey would be notified in sufficient 
time. Cortelyou's policy was to c h.::J.nge t his system in order to 
bring about a complete separation of the Treasury Department 
from the influence of II'Tall Street and private business. When 
t he "Ric 11 Hen's Panic" broke in February and l',farch, naturally, 
t ne neVll policy ~.KTas delayed. He t nen· introduced an appointed com-
10 
mittee to decide on future policy. T he object was to take 
such surplus money and deposit it in stable banking institutions 
through legal means, and further to keep the public informed as 
to what measures 'lITere being taken. Now in August, 1907, a five 
,~.'eek deposit plan ·was initiated and on October 20 the sum of 
~~166 ,000,000 was reported to ffive been used according to this 
11 
new plan. All went well until the October ffrun" on the banks 
necessitated the Secretary's personal appearance in New York 
12 
City. 
13 
On October 23, Cortelyou poured $35,000,000 
of federal money into New York ba~~s, the security given was 
10 "Was hington Notes," 625 
11 Ib~c;!., 626 
12 New York Times, October 24, 1907, 1 
10 $25,000,000 is the amount listed in the October 24, 1807 New 
York Times, but ,~::S5,OOO,000 is what the Secretary states in 
his Report to the Senate on January 29, 1908 
.. 
based on municipal and railroad bond s. t<~very ef1'ort had been 
made to stop the lln .. mll and stablize both foreign anri cwmestic 
14 
business. Nevertheless, the "run" del:,leted the available 
49 
cash. It thus became nscessary for him to ask for the "coopera-
15 
tion of the press ll in reestablishing that calm wnich was so 
necessary in time of strife. 
One month later, the Secretary issued ~jaOO, 000,000 
in thres per cent, one year notes, and $50,000,000 iFi txo per 
eent bonds under the Panama Canal Act. The circular was issued 
in the middle of the mont 11 by the l'reasury Dep8.rtment and ex-
l)lained that such money was to be deposited on the government's 
account or that the banks could use the nelflT security for in-
creasing their mvn note circulation. The ban..ks, however, and 
private individuals refused to take advantage of this offering 
and in less than a week's time the sale of the three per cent 
notes was susyended in an abrupt manner. There had been issued 
14 New York Times, October 24, 1907, 1; Journal of Political 
Economy, 15:627, December, Id07 
15 Nation, 85:390, October 31, 1807 
1-6 
16 The banks were substituting reserve money for the notes, wnic 
were not legal as reserve; if the bonds acted as government 
collateral, the banks would lose 16 to 25;1; on exchange. Eithe;r 
way would force t 11e ban-.ks to redu.ce reserves during an urgent 
cash shortage 
50 
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less than one-fifth of the entire amount Hnd this brought about 
17 
an end to the experiment. Some held that these measures 
18 
1Nere undeniably inflatio:qary. On the other hand, the Ad-
ministration denied this and .()ointed Ol1t that bank statements 
were up by November 17 and that t lJ.e first s til ,ment of gold had 
19 
arrived from England. 
T he role played by the Clearing House ~ertificates 
in the Panic is most interl?sting. A Clearing House, as Cannon 
point s out, It ••• is a place where all the re~uresentati ves of 
the banks ••• meet . . . to settle accounts with each other, 
... and so 'clear' the transactions of the day for WInch the 
20 
settlement is made." The settlement of the day's business 
is so important that only members are able to 'clear' througn 
the facilities so set up. There are tvm classes of Clearing 
Houses; the first siml)ly clears notes, checks, and lH{latever 
else is agreeQ upon; the second is concerned llVith the rules and 
regulations governing the rates of excha.nf~es and charges. The 
most important funct'ions of the Clearing House are five in num-
ber: 1, loans to the goverrunent; 2, assistance to members; 3, 
17 "A Financial Anniversary," Nation, 87:503, November 19, 1908 
18 "Treasury Relief Measures," Nation, 85:460, November ~l., 1807 
19 Ibid., 85: 486, l~ovember 28, 1;J07 
a:0 Cannon, 97 
·"" 
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uniform rates for deposits; 4, uniform rates of exchange and 
coLLection; and 5, the issuance of the Clearing HOU0e loan 
21 
certificates. 
In actual operation the Clearing House demands 
51 
that each debtor bank pays its debtor balance before one tnirty 
o'clock on the business day. Then after that time, the creuitor 
22 
banks receive t neir balances. New York stands out for the 
rather rigorous conditions imposed on nOD-member banks, and for 
23 
the safeguards it has set up to protect its members. Pre-
vious to January, 1808, no law of the New York Clearing House 
demanded the twenty-five per cent reserve tnat tne member banks 
held. This is important in understanding the issuance of the 
certificate loans. 
T he first Clearing House certificates were issued 
24 
on October 26, 1807. They were temporary loans made by 
associate banks, acti~g as a Clearing House Association, to ~em-
bers for the settlement of their Clearing House balances~ 
21 Cannon, 98 
22 Ibid., 104 
23 Ibid. 
24 Sprague, 429; see Appendix D 
~5 Cannon, 108 
25 
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During t he time of the Panic, currency I".":ould not be eX}landed 
fELst enough. Thus it became necessary for the banks ,. acting 
tflroup; h the Clearing House, to take proper ste:ps. A loan cow-
52 
mittee was set up C0r11)osed of five bank officials wit t1 tne pres-
. ident of the Clearing House acting in an advisary (x.1.pacity. T ne 
certificates issued assumed the plar:!e of money that could I}ot 'be 
obtained readily for the purpose of keeping banks on cre1iits 
and debits. The use of certificates was confined to the paymtmt 
of the balance due to associate banks. 
Cannon holds that without such certificates, it 
vvould have been almost imrossible for the governmen.t to import 
gold from Europe since the cprtificates created the absent 
credit. Such credit was essential, otherwise, imj.orts could not 
be sent without the payment for tne transfers and bills of ex-
26, 
c (lange. T 11e interest rate on these certificates is im.i.Jor-
tanto Sprague holds that the interest was beneficial as the 
banks wished to retire their loans as soon as the crisis was 
over and thereby Save the interest charged. N as h 110lds that 
there 1vas not one instance in t r:P. nine tines wnere the loans 
26 Cannon, 111 
27 Sprague, 184; he also considers t his issuance as the hig nest 
form of bank cooperation but would discourap;e legalizing tnem 
for this would destroy their success 
53 
28 
were used ttat a sing..Le dollar was lost. Despite the fact 
that it was rejJorted that the public did not lose confidenr;e in 
29 
tae loan certificates or with the Clearing House itself, 
some hold that SUCD loans were tl1e cause of tne "general cash 
30 
suspension lf • It was also believed t nat the Clearing House 
certificates merely prolonged official stimuli to the currency 
IJroblem and that their issuance merely added to the financial 
i.11s. This was due to their inability to be accepted on all 
levels of exchange. 
Whetner the day was saved by the let-iding capital-
ists, or by the Treasury action, or by the part piayed by the 
Clearing House certificates, or by any other one factor is a 
lJoint very difficult to decide. Perhaps tne arriva.l of gold. 
from E:urope helped. It could be that ti1e finanr;ial interests 
of the country were united in attacking a COIDF)On enemy and that 
the efforts of all resulted in a confidenr;e ~\I{Jich broke t {]e 
cause of tne Panic, fear and indecision. Confir;ence aid appear 
but its appearance will be discussed in a more cOrrJi)lete picture 
in Chapter VII. 
28 William A. Nash, "The New York Clearing House," T he Currency 
Problem and the Present Financia.l Situation, Columbia Univer-
, sity Press, New York, 1908, 92; see Appendix E 
29 Ibid., 93 
30 "Recovery frorn Panic, n 487 
£lIAPTER VI 
-FINA.NCIAL GCOPE 
The Panic originated in New York City. Its full 
effect seems to have centered on the .Ba~tern seaboard wnicn 
depended to a great extent on the center of finance's heart 
beat. The comple"ce picture, however, 1"10uld be missing if the 
i~pression were given that the remainder of the country, as well 
as the whole world, was not affected. It must be remembered 
t hat the West was blamed for hoarding its reserves and that it 
was unwj.lling to ship these East. During the emergency there 
V,T2S a feeling that Western financiers and smaller fina.ncial in-
stitutions had acted in an unorthodox manner. Not only did t 
keep their reserves but demanded that the New York banking in-
sti tutions ref1.m.d their deposit s. In 13.11 fairness, however, it 
must be stated that the smaller banks did deposit their meager 
reserveS in Ne\~T York financial lnstitutions and they felt quite 
stronglY' that ttley should be the first to receive any refunds. 
They beJ.ieved that they 'were a safeguard for the wnole nation's 
economy and in particular during the I1run fr late in October. 
Furthern10re the Wosterners were convinced that they had suffer 
enough :in past financial panics and did not intend to become' 
victims sacrificed on the altar in the East. They stressed the 
54 
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fact that too much had been lost already in crop-movings and 
in the San Francisco fire and eart 11Qua1,::e to j.~ermit their 
section to risk any more money. It is almost a truism that 
those who possess the nation's purse strings possess them for 
the very reason that they realize what they have and are tnere-
by unwilling to lose them no matter vrhat the urp:ency or reason 
may be. 
Naturally conditions throu?l1out the country were 
not in the financial ~haos that existe.d in New York. Of cou.rse 
large industrial ~enters were affect8d quite severely be~ause 
they depended on th8 free flow of industry and rnanu.facturing. 
In a word, the Panic tou~hed a1.1 parts of the en-eire country 
but not to the same degree. ~,oreover, Europe, Africa, ASia, 
E.nu South America were affected almost as nuch as the United 
States. Even at this time t he financial web 11J'as so tightly 
Foven that a broken strand in anyone place affected the whole 
r!eb. Today we have become fully convinced of this fact through 
the un~sentle hands of hard experience. 
Specifica.Lly, the Egyptian market collapsed al-
l 
most at the same time as the Japanese market fell in A~ril. 
1 Noyes, "A Year After," 202 
.. 
In the middle of October, Montreal felt the blol'v of its Stock 
2 
56 
Exchange panic; in far 8.vJay Hamburg, Germnay the worst upset 
in the city's financial history v1Tas experienced about the same 
3 
time. T he Paris and Berlin exchanges reported on October 22 
trlat their openings 'I;,rere firm but dropped sharply as the news of 
4 
the "runn on the Nev'\T York banks had rebched them. Santiago, 
Chile, Amsterdam, Genoa, and Copenhagen suffered severe crises 
5 
alrnost simultaneously 1~rith New' York. London and PariS, 
though not sufferi~g from actual paniC, were forced to readjust 
their financial structure. This was done in the hope that they 
1Nould escape the full force of the ",Torld wide financial blow. 
It is understandable why London and Paris took 
such measures when we remember the gold borrowing on the part of 
the United States. Both countries had a central bank and all. 
finance revolved throug h it. When the Panic struck financial 
circles in the Uni t8d states and investigations J..:,roved that a 
shortage of currency existed, it became hi~hly imperative to get 
more gold in a hurry. 
2 New York Times, October 16, 1907, 14 
3 Noyes, uA Year After," 203 
4 New York Ti~~~, October 23, 1907, 15 
5 Noyes, ft A Year l.l.fter, n 204 
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Naturally America turned to England for proof of her promise to 
6 
ext8nci. aici. if it were necessary. The Grisis in Amsterdam 
ann Hamburg had to a certain extent de}Jleted the usual gold 
7 
sur,:,ply held by f.i~ngland. The Bank of H~lg1and was Gompelled 
to borrow from the Bank of France in order to fulfill its 
promises and at the same time safeguard the English economic 
balance. It would appear then that LonGon banks were in a sim-
i1ar plight with their American cousins. But. this is not the 
case, because the English insisted that a reSArve of at least 
8 
forty per cent be deposited with them. Now when gold is 
borrowed, some kind of credit is necessary to act as collateral 
!for such borrow'ing. But Clearing House certificates and 
Treasury money served as a basis for our European financial 
9 
deals. According to a writer in the Natj,_Q.l} vve borrQ1.r:red on 
10 
creci.it but were forced to pay wit h commodities. The Bank 
of England was forced, ciuring the crisis and panic, to continue 
to raise its rates in orcier to SeC1ITe pa~Dent from other coun-
tries so that it could lend the United States the gold 
6 New York Eve~igg PQ.st, July 21, 1~06, Financial Section, 1 
7 Aldric h, Senate Document 538, ~'.45 
8 ftPanic,1~07,TI 51 
9 Cannon, 111 
lO "Treasury Relief," 460 
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11 
requested. 
With the arrival of gold shipments during November 
and December confictence in the currency and general financial 
picture ciel=larted from the fear steege and assumed the at'citude of 
confidence once more. As soon as this confidence a~~eared, the 
Panic almost automatically was forced to disap i:-iear and the 
crucial period had passed. 
11 England's rate rose to 7% on November 7. During November 
and December :;:;90,000,000 worth of gold arrived in New York; 
~p73,400,000 from England al ne, Sprague, 284 
.. 
QHAPrER VII 
C0l1FIDE1'JCE IS F{SSTORED ,.. 
It is just as difficult to set a definite date 
for the ending of any panic as it is to set one for its begin-
ning. One's fears and lack of confidence are intangible things 
and it is quite hard to pin them down as having begun or ended 
at this particular moment or time. Of necessity, this is a mat-
ter of choice. It was stated in the early chapters of this 
work that the Panic of 1907 officially began on October 22, the 
date of the J:(.nickerbocker bank "run". Some explanation is in 
order before setting a specific date for the end of the finan-
cial upset. 
Some hold that this Panic ended almost as abruptly 
as it began. These give the date of October 24 because the fi-
nancial kings and the United States' Treasury had poured over 
1 
$75,000,000 into the money market to try to stabilize it. 
others, on the other hand, are of t fie opinion that when the 
certified New York checks were no longer selling at discount, 
1 Inglis, 1646-1649; anot her reason was that confidence returned 
with the issuance of Clearing House certificates and news of 
gold arriving from England 
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the emergency had disappeared. This was on January ~, 1908. 
T he rise of stocks and bonds in the Nev.r York Exc hange during 
2 
January, 1908 helped to build confidence. This also is adduced 
3 
as an aciditional reason for their choice of this date. 
Fundamentally, the two opinions stated above con-
cerning the date of the ending of the Panic of 1907 are ~urely 
a matter of personal opinion. To a great measure they depend 
60 
upon the attitude of the individual as to where the credit sYtould 
be placed for remedying t he financial upset. Those favoring 
Big Business interests maintain that the Panic ende(l when busi-
ness interests placed its money on the open market. The backers 
of the United S tates' Treasury state tl~t the crisis was al1evi 
ated as soon as the Department took active measures. Those who 
defend the Clearing House hold that its loan certificates gave 
a formal basis for local confidence and intern;'J.tional security 
for the newly imported European gold. Another group maintains 
tnat all materially aided in restoring confidence. Wilen confi-
dence in financial circles was gradually restored, several things 
happened. The premium on currency was lowered and gradually 
2 "Premium on Currency," 44 
3 "Recovery From Panic Depression," Nation, 86: 2S5, Marc h 5, ItJ08 
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discontinued. Hoarded money found its way back into circulation 
AS a result, in January the Stock JVIarket was able to forge a-
head and banks began to show a significantly favorable balance; 
business was given the necessary stimulus throug h these finan-
cial movements which breathed an air of confidence, security, 
and safety. 
For the purpose of establishing some definiteness 
to the financial Panic of 1907, it may be safely stated that it 
began on Tuesday, October 22, 1907 and continued until the last 
day of December of that same year. These ten weeks with all 
their maneuverings sum up all the material mentioned heretofore 
and constitute what is meant in this thesis by the Panic of 
1907. Of course this is the present writer's conclusion but 
it is believed that t he facts adduced fully support such a con-
elusion. 
Naturally, it would be a gravely mistaken iml1res-
sion for anyone to assume that economic stability v!as cOfl1plete 
established by the first of the new year. At this time the New 
York banks provided cash for their local depositors but not for 
4 
the inland banks. These inland banks were not able to cas h 
4 "Premium on CUrrency," 45 
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t heir drafts in New York City banks. They even eliminated the 
dis~ount demanded because they no longer required such extra 
money due to the fact that t:ileir hoarded surpluses more than 
covered t il.e demand for veri t hdrawls. 
T he financial, commercial, and industrial picture 
brightened considerably with the revival of confidence in the 
banks and the beginning of business enterprises such as the re-
opening of the steel mills and the demand of ,[{estern and southern 
5 
buyers for dry goods. It may be assumed t h:3.t recovery as 
usual lagged behind the restored confidence even thoug h the 
crisis had been passed. Production had almost stopped and quite 
naturally wages sto;;ped, too. Thus a.ll types of business had 
been injured. The cycle needed a stimulus. Demands for materi-
als from the sout h and west provided part of this stimulus but 
much more was needed. . Basic den1ands vrere present but money to 
turn these into a~tuality was absent. The iiost-Panic picture 
seemed to be one of watchful waiting. Since a nation's business 
economy depends to a great degree upon money in actual circula-
tion and when this condition is not fulfillea, the na.tural result 
is then similar to a vaccum. The ciomestic business picture slow-
ly and the foreign scene rapidly paralled it. It will be 
5 Noyes, "RecoverY,1I 480 
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remembered that gold had been used in exchd.nge for agricultural 
commodities. America was fortunate in hC'lving a surplus whic n 
coula. be used as an exchange item, but prices were low and so 
'JlTere wages. Reserves It'Tere not available to help in the begin-
ning of the cycle. Furthermore, America was not the only 
country injured by the economic UI)Set., T he entire world felt 
its blow and foreign countries were not able to prime the com-
mercial cycle. Countries such as England and France, witnessed 
no actual upset but they were alarmed by the necessity of ex-
changing gold for American use and found themselves, thereby, 
under a heavy strain. Unfortunately, the minor boom following 
the January rise in the Stock Market soon turned into a world-
6 
wide depression. 
Fortunately, industry and commerce were not 
completely paralyzed 'in America during the late winter and 
early spring of 1808. As Feder states: If ••• during ••• 1908 
factories and shops operated on part time, and when they shut 
7 
down activity in other line~ offered employment •••• n Never-
theless, no complete survey of the national unemployment scene 
was made. Yet some measure of its extent can be gleaned from 
6 This work is not directly conr;erned with the 1908 dejJression; 
consequently, details are omitted 
7 Leah H. Feder, Unemployment Relief in Periods of DepreSSion, 
Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1936, 189 
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ot her sources. Immigration declined and emigration i!l-;re&:::;ea; 
rAlief agencies reported a sharp increase of applicants'; and, 
8 
lOan cornpaniesexperienced a tremendous rush of business. 
There was a dema.nd for emergency work to be supplied by the 
government. Labor demonstra.tions became widespread, even though 
the depression of 1908 was not quite as severe as the one in 
9 
the late 1880's. 
It must be stated, however, that the depression 
subsequent to the Panic of 1807 is not the to1-,ic of this work 
but its inclusion is necessary to complete the l..ii,.::ture. In all 
justice, a few vmrds shoula be said about the role played by 
the New York Stock Exchange 'which was intentionally passed over. 
In order to avoid any confusion about the economic uj-'heavo...L at 
its start, the Stock Exchange had been left for later treat-
mente In summary form the following may be stated to clarify 
the role played by the Exchange in the Panic of 1907. The con-
census of expert opinion in financial circles is that the Stock 
Exchange was not resljonsible for any over-extension or over-
syeculation. The blame for this falls squarely u.r:Jon the 
8 Feder, 192 
9 Ibid., 197 
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shoulders of business in general. By consulting Appendix 
F, proof is given that the changes on the Exchange took place 
l:;revious to the October Panic and that no evidence of specula-
tive expansion is indicated for the market was below normal. 
Had general business been sounCi, the Stock l\f.arl\:et would have 
slowly risen fo..Llowing its forced liquidation. 
Meyer points out, furthermore, that no bank or 
trust company failed during the crucial ten weeks because of 
11 
loans or investments in any Exchange securities. As a writer 
in the Nation points out: "During all the months before the Octo-
ber Panic, Wall Street's indications of coming trouble were 
treated ••• as ••• Cassandra warnings; but the prudent 
12 
. . . hid 
themselves or their money." 1Nall street and the Stock Ex-
change have always been the financial barometers of the state of 
13 
the nation's finances. Nevertheless, the economy and high 
spirits of the time left the general population with the false 
idea that no more financial upsets would ever spoil the grand 
economic situation which they were enjoying. Yet, the solemn 
10 Eugene Meyer Jr., "The New York Stock Exchange and the Panic 
of 1~07," Yale Review, 18:36, May, 1909 
11 Ibid., 38 
12 "Wall Street Vindicated,ff Nation, 86:27, January 8, 1B08 
13 Ibid. 
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14 
warnings had been sounded but \~rent unheeded. As soon as the 
storm broke, it se':omed that everyone turned to the stock f1~xchange 
and blar:led it unjustly for allowing suc 11 things to take place. 
This was due in part to the past mistakes of the :::i~xchange. How-
ever, months after the Exchange succeeded in placing itself on a 
firm basis after the upheaval, it 11IJas not slow in turning its 
attention to give all possible aid to the liquidation of the in-
dustries and businesses of the entire country. It was in this 
way that many mistakenly misunderstood and believed that the 
cause of suc h liquidation vms the Exchange instead of those for 
wnom it was acting. Thus, when smaller markets were not able to 
meet their notes, business on the ?xchange iJractically reached 
the panic state on that fatal Oc~ober 24th day. 
Meyer believes that one of the most imjJortant rec-
ommendations follOWing the ul.heaval should be the establishment 
of a free market for liquid securities in Nei¥ York: 
A country without a market in 
which liquid securities can 
be readily converted into cash, 
is a country i:vithout any safe 
economic barometer of the move-
ment of capital and tne demands 
for it, without the means of at-
tracting and holding foreign 
14 Chicago DailY Tribune, February 1, 1~07, 14 
capital and whic h can never aspire 
to become the financial centerc.of 
the '-'Torld. 15 
67 
Hence, it may be stated that the end of the Panic 
YJas purely figurative. To show what brought about its conclu-
sian is the best way to permit one to get and assimilate the ' 
Ddture, extent, and final phase of the tragic financial occur-
rence whi<'!h, had proper measure been taken, should never have 
hapbJened • 
15 Meyer, 46 
CHAFTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
From 1833 to 1906 there were many depressions 
19hich almost rent asunder the financial fabric of t ne United 
states. Some of these were broug:nt about by panics. Unfortu-
nately, many people were the unwij_~ing victims of financial 
lep;erdemain. Others who should have kndlwn better suffered ter-
rific losses through their O\m uncontrolled avarice. Panics 
invariably bring about deJ..,ressions even though depressions do 
not always involve panics. As '·',as stated previously, a depres-
sion is a prolonged Jeriod of business stagnation while a panic 
is basically a stoppage on the rise of prices. The former is 
more endurable than the latter. It is far easier to give a 
description of tne effects of a panic or a dejJression than it is 
to ferret out their fundamental causes. 
Usually a situation develolis wherein the majority 
are slo1}Jly lulled into a feeling of false security and blind 
themselves to the visible signs a~parent in the shaky flimancial 
scene. They believe that their fTgood times" are the normal way 
of life and thus are unshakeable. Shaw, the Secretary of the 
68 
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Treasury, played an unenviable role in promoting such false se-
curity by means of rQS private deals with selected financial 
tycoons from Wall street. 
Financially our nation had just passed through the 
second stage of financial growth which is akin to lusty a(101es-
cence in nature. The country was struggling mightily with all 
the vim and vigor of a people too desireous to succeed, to be 
recognized, and to blaze a brilliant trail ahead. By 1~06, de-
mands had been made for capital, materials, and workers to join 
in the task of fulfilling the incessant clamor for new construc-
tion. New construction necessitates expansion in all fields. A 
terrific set back was felt, however, on April 8, 1906 when tne 
devastating and horrible earthquake and fire in San Francisco 
literally shook the nation in more \flays than physically. 'l'ne 
l.'vest coast was hardest hit. Eastern insurance companies were 
forced to draw on their reserves to bear Ui- ltnder the full af-
fects of the shock. This disaster was not a direct cause of the 
Panic of 1907. Prices actually arose (juring t he summer mont hs of 
1906. Dividends were high as a consequence, and the large finan-
cial institutions once more opened their doors to cayital from 
t he smaller inland banks. Despite the im;-,iortation of gold, the 
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stock market began its decline durtng December. With the davm 
of the new year no es were high that conditions woulci son'e hOW 
right themselves. During February ana ic!larch, 1807, banking in-
stitutions found themselves in the embarrassing prenico..ment of 
being forced to make loans on t he very loans which they had .pre-
. vii·usly arrange6. The result of this financial sleig (Jt of hand ) 
was the only too well knovm If Rich Men's Panic". The public 
fort'lUlately refused to nibble at this financial bait and as a 
consequence, money became acutely short. 
When Cr.arles W. Morse and his fripnds slJ.ddenly 
lhTit hdrew from an active int!?rpst in their banks, rumors began to 
fly. At this time, t he New York Clearing llOuse Committee fou.nd 
it necessary to rus h to the aid of the faltering Mercantile 
Na'tional Bank on October 18. United Copper's sudden flig!it from 
the financial control of this bank almost brought the Mercantile 
TJational Bank to t he point of financial suicirJ.e t l:le day previ-
ously. Of course it was only natural for rUL10rs of a dire natl.lre 
to slJread once the Clearing House Committee moved into the pic-
ture. Charles T. Barney's resignation froEl the Knic]'\"erboc},er 
Trust Company did not he.lp the situation one bit.· But when the 
j{ational Bank of Commerce formally and steadfastly refused to 
• 
accept checks dra1J'TI1 on the distressed institution, many believed 
their suspicions to be basically sound. 
Following the eventful meeting on the ~?lst at 
snerry 1 S Restaurant, the morning nens}.:apers cCirried the coml)lete 
and dismal story in all its gory details. Quite understandably, 
early in the morning too ]:):)peful depositors lined up before tile 
Knickerbocker Trust Company in order to withdravll their savings • 
.As t bat fateful Tuesday, October E2, progressed suspicions Qid 
not lag and the result was that almost all banks experienced 
financial "runs" during the next few days. It must be remem-
bereci t hat the trust companies 1 c !l2.rters lacked s~uecific pro-
visions regulating currency, clemi:md de1·osits, cash reserves, 
and strictures on investments. TrlUs, trust companies and in-
surance groups pr;,~cticaL!_y had a free hand to do what they 
pleased vvith t he money placed in their hands. 
The task performed by the loan committee, compo-
sed of five bank presidents, was most commendable. This commit-
tee, the Treasury Department, and business intere~ts helped 
metterially in heel.ding off complete sta.2.;nation of general busi-
ness. These three groups agrepd that it was necessary to offer 
'.' :'\-:' 
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premiums for currency. Thro1lf;h this means, it was hOl'8(j that 
noarded cash 'would be brought out of "lining. It is estimated 
t (at over two hun<ireu t inrty million QO .. LLars 1'Jas l".d.c,den and of 
course stagnant. In spite of the four ~\er !:!ent premiums, t ne 
money remained just w ,'1ere it was - hidden and unavailable • 
The banks could see no clear way to expand tne 
volume of money. On!:!e these banks had become enrrJesrJed in the 
tangle of their own f'inclllcial maneuverings their future became 
(luite hopeless. All acreed t ha.c t!~e remedy for tillS situation 
v,ras a firm, sound, safe, and flexible currency. 
In an attemr:t to uncover the !:!ause or causes of 
the Panic of 1907, four main evils stand out prominently. Cur-
rency, banks, over-speculation, and, to some, President Theo-
dore Roosevelt are given eithpr as a main cause or a combina-
tion of causes. It is a matter of opinion vThich of the above 
mentioned played the stellar role but it is a fact t I'jat all 
contributed. (,;uite naturally, opinion was divided as to where 
or to whom proper credit s110uld be given for savinf the finan-
cial debacle. Some say "Big Business" deserves the credit. 
Others maintain that the Secretary of the Treasury's actions 
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mitigated the dei.lressing effects of the Panic. Still ot hers 
stress the im.r:.1ortant role played by Clearing House certificates. 
Tnese were temlJOrary loans made by associate banks, acting as a 
Clearing House Association, to member~ for the settlement of tne 
Clearing House balances. Suc h certificates were negotiated as 
money and could be readily obtained. Yet, their appearance made 
it IJossible to iElj)Ort gold from Europe. The interest on them 
was high and in away t [Jis vms proved to be beneficial as the 
reciplilent banks were only too anxious to pass t'l(;I!J on in orcier to 
save money. Not one single dollcJ.r, however, was lost tnrough 
their use. 
'l'owards the end of Decenber 1:;;07, tne Panic had 
lJractically subsided. The SJ.OW return of confidence proved to 
be a slight stimulus for industry anci business. Some, novv'ever, 
misread t nis and believed that the wheels of lJrogress would gain 
sufficient momentum of t hemsel ves. l' hey were tragically mis-
taken. After a sudden sUrge, the Stock Exchange experienceu. a 
sudden decline. In the late spring and early summer, commerce 
and inaustry droj)ped dangerously low. At this time the ciej,Jres-
sion ofH,08 slowly reared its ugly head and seemed determined 
to feast on the misery creiited by the Panic a's long as possible. 
Before the de,,9ress;ion, subsequent to the Panic, was able to 
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fasten its debilitating tentaeles on the commercial ana finan-
cial life of our nation, t he Panic (1aCl haa a.Lmost immec.idte re-
percussions t nroughout the world. Fortunately , Clowever , England 
and France took immediate steps to forestall a financial dis-
aster ¥,ritnin their· own slrpere and such efforts were successful. 
These measures, so o.L_~portunely anri sagelY used abroad, were 
studied later and incorporated into the American economic 
system. 
The derression following the Panic Vias final proof 
t (jat something must be done to >revent future recurrences of 
SUCD financial distress. As a result, the Aldrich-Vreeland Act 
was passed hastily on May 30, 1908, seven [<Ionths after the Octo-
I 
ber Panic. As is usually the case with [lCLSty legislatiun, 
bearing on an involved subject, it misfired, tnough its inten-
tions were the best. As Laughlin pointed out: tlItfihe Act) is 
a curious coroi· ound of conflicting views, compromises, haste, and 
2 
j:Jolitics; but it is the law of tne land •••• t1 
Both political parties \yere in mortal fear tLlat 
trey would be sadej.].ed with the odium for the Panic and the 
1 J. Laurence Laughlin, "The Aldrich-Vreeland Act, II Journal of 
Political Economy, 16:490, October, 1908 
2 Ibid., 498-499 
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subsequent depression. The Republicans, being the party in power 
were determined t nat t (lB blame vlOulcL not be laid at their Qoor; 
the Democrat s, on the other band, were equally as cietermined to 
stress their part in working out t ne present and future economic 
stability. The issue, however, was too large, too pertinent, 
and entirely too complicated for the legislators, whether Eepub-
lican or Democrat. Nevertheless, aLL agreed that somet.hing 
had to be done and that quickly in order to satisfy the rising 
clamor of public unrest and disgust. As a result of this de-
termination to "do something" quickly, the patchwork Aldrich-
Vreeland Bill was voted upon before printed cOljies had been is-
sued to the legislators. Naturally, too many of t ne legislators 
lacked the slig:htest con~eption of w(Jat thfj pm'ported Bill was 
supposed to "dOll or wnat it actually meant. Laughlin summarizes 
tDis situation as fol~ows: 
• ••• we h&ve in -this Ald~ich­
Vreeland Act - the product of 
a few days struggle at the end 
of the session - an unexpected 
freedom of issues based on 
banking assets, as well as a 
Pandora's box full of unknown 
possibilities for evil. It is 
an amazing lesson on the folly 
of politics in banking. 3 
Although Laughlin's criticism is not overly exaggeratecl it does 
3 Laughlin, 513 
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neglect the two iF1i)ortant achievements of the Act. The national 
ba.nks were now given the privilege of issuing emergency currency 
in times of financial disturbance and the National Monetary Com-
mission was created. The latter's }iurpose was nto secure an 01'-
ganization of capital and crer:lit maintained under all circum-
4 
stances and conditions •••• n 
After an investipation of four years of vmrld CUI'-
rency systems, plans were drafted for t ne United States' banking 
and currency reforms. The year following the Commission's re-
port, the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was adopted. Ever since 
t hat year it has been the weLL rounded, stablizing force pro-
tecting American investors and the nation's economy. This fa-
mous Act created a series of sectional banks governed by a Fed-
5 
eral Heserve Board (whic h consisted of seven mernbers). A 
Federal Heserve Bank was to be established in twelve districts 
of the country. Every national bank bad to del)Osit its reserve 
6 
in t nis new type' bank. T he Act fUrther L,rovided for the 
creation of Fed€ral Reserve notes to aid in giving more 
4 Aldrich, Monetary Commission, 3 
5 Two of t he members were t he Secret ary of the 'rreasury and the 
Comptroller of the Currency; while, t 11e ot her five were to be 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for a 
ten year term. From the latter group snould corne the governor 
of the entire board 
6 State banks had the privilege of using these city hanks' cash 
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elasticity to the currency. 
Thus we have seen t flat it was almost necessary 
for t he nation to suffer from a series of succeeding panics anti 
(leiJressions before our le.2;islators were forced by the logic of 
cold, hard financial fa.cts to fas (don an instrurnent wnich would 
give protection to all. The need and dire necessity of such a 
legislative instrument was brought into bold relief by the Panic 
of 1907. Though the suffering, consequent to the Panic and de-
pression, .vas nard to bear, the fruit is brought fort 11 in the 
form of the Federal Heserve Act was wort J~y of all the suffering. 
7 John D. Hicks, A Short Histor;y: of American Democracy, Houghton 
Mifflin Co., New York, 1943, 640 
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APPENDIX A 
'".'.; 
PER CAPITA COlIJSUH(PIIOl'I OF ALCOHOLIC 
~ --
BEVbRAGES IN T.HE UNITED S'IIATES -* 
Year Wines j,lalt Spirits 'J.1otal Gallons 
(t!,Hllons) Liquors (proof 
'-
",., 
(gallons) gallons) 
1840 .?9 1.36 ~:.52 4.17 
1850 
.. 
,27 1.58 2.23 4.08 
1860 .35 ~;;. 22 ;:-:.86 6.43 
1870 .32 5.31 ;~. 07 7.70 
1880 .56 8.26 1.27 10.08 
. 
1890 .46 1:3.67 1.40 15. 5~'5 
1900 .39 16.02 1.28 17.69 
1908 .60 20.97 1.44 23.01 
-
* Ernest L .• Bogart and Charles N. Thompson, Readj.nvs. in the 
Economic History of the United St8~es, Longmans, Green and Co., 
New York, 1~25, 835 
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).PPENDIX B 
~ICTURE OF THE nHCKEHBOCKER tlHU1\jfl -* 
* Harper'~ WeeklY, 51:1646, November 9, 1907 
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WALL STREET DURING THE BANKING PANIC 
I 
Willi .': IIt 'N OHI·; ns or AI'I'H Ellt: :'<' $ IVE U .tI ·O~ITO"S Tlllto.:xm:u WALL STHt: ET Uti RI:"i O Tin: IIEIGII T or 1.:H iT Wt:t:K 'S IIiST li RlIA :'il' E 1:S Til":: 
FI:SA:'\ (' I.-\f~ WORT.lJ. on u m II t·~ lInF:n~. I.t: ~~ \TI'.\U.Y CON CERNED. WATC lfF..n TilE SPEc.:TAc r~E . ' ROM :,a; WIIRORISO POINTS 0 . ' \ 'ASTAOE 
IG47 
. APPENDIX C 
SA1V1PLE ADD ~~ 
? 
puy and sell hills of 
LEI'TERS exc mnge ami make ca-
of ble transfers of money 
CREDIT on all foreign ;Joints; 
also make collections, 
and issue CornmerQial 
and Travellers' Credits 
available in all parts 
of the \i7 orl<1. 
International Cheques.Certif1cates of 
Deposit. 
]3rQi;'ffi Brothers and Co. 
No. 59 Wall Street, Ne1i\T York 
* Nation, 85:455, November 14, 1907 
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RPPENDIX D 
SAMPLES OF EMERGENCY MONEY * 
* Quarterly Journal of Economics, 22:516-518, August, 1908 
A mony Ihe /ollowing sam ples 0/ emcrgenc!J currcnc!! S os. 1 __ rcprcoenl c/Paring-h oll se 
certi{u;ales; Nos'. 9- 10, clearing-holl c checks; N os. il - 15, cashiers' checks TJlJyable 10 
bearer ; N o. 16 , reserve agent e.l'c!wngc; N os. I i - I . , dep()sit cel'li!icalcs; anrl S os. 19- 24, 
mcm u /aclurers' pa.y scrip. F or i', o . 6, 8 , 15, _ I , fU, 2.;, and 24 I a III inde/Jleti I() I he 
collection 0/ lIfr. Theodore H . Price, 0/ .v ew Y oTk. 
NO. 1. 
No.2 . 
NO.3 (Reverl'e of No. 2). 
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'APPENDIX E 
CLEARINU HOUSE CEFTIFICATE ISSUANCE * 
The date of the first issue was. October 26,1907 
The date of the first cancellation 1Nas November 14, 1~)07 
The date of tr~ final issue was January 30, 1908 
The date of the final cancellation was Marc.h 28, 1908 
The gross issue was $101,060,000 
The maximum amount outstanciing was $88,420,000, December 16, 18Q7 
* Sprague, 428 
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APPENDIX F 
STOCK EXCdANGE CHANGES PREVIOUS TO OCTOBER 1907 ~~ 
Year Trans- Increase Total Increase 
actions or value, or 
in shares, decrease Millions decrease 
Millions of dollars % 
'1903 .., 161 - I'-- 11,000 --- -
1904 187 6.1 12,061 9.1 
1905 263 40.2 21,295 76.8 
1906 284 8.0 ~23, 393 8.9 
1907 196 -31.0 14,757 -36.8 
* Meyer, 36 
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